Agent identity
How AI agents get scoped, revocable access to tools and services when they act on behalf of people.
These entries cover the access questions behind the Agentic Identity Broker, which Magnus Jungsbluth and I built for agents that act on behalf of people. Each one explains what the relevant IETF and Model Context Protocol (MCP) specifications actually require and where our broker design fits. The MCP specification still changes between revisions, so the MCP entry names the revision it describes.
Entries
- Should an agent use a robot account or delegated access?
When an agent acts for a person, give it delegated access that names both the person and the agent, with narrow scopes, an expiry, and a way to revoke it. A robot account shared by several people gives the agent their …
- How does OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange keep provider tokens away from agents?
OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange (RFC 8693) lets a client trade one token for another token meant for a specific target service. When a gateway runs that exchange on each tool call, as in the Agentic Identity Broker, the …
- How should people grant and revoke an agent's access?
Let people grant each agent access per service, with a permission set they choose and an expiry, and let them revoke that grant at any time. Revoking the grant has to stop every token derived from it, so keep issued …
- How does authorization work for MCP servers?
In the MCP authorization specification (revision 2026-07-28), a protected MCP server over HTTP is an OAuth 2.1 resource server: it publishes Protected Resource Metadata that points clients to its authorization server and …
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